1| Introduction
The realm of cosmopolitics and international relations, like the realms of right and ethics, is viewed by the liberal tradition as a domain of rational law. Kant's aspiration for cosmopolitics was a sphere in which international law, consistent with the dictates of reason, would express the will of every rational being unbiased by geographical and local contingencies and moral irrelevancies. 1 This Enlightenment project, in so many ways bound to the political device of the social contract, still looms large over any attempt to understand and construct institutions and procedures for those issues which affect individuals as individuals yet require transnational cooperation and enforcement.
Laws, according to Kant, should be universal, reciprocal and public. These three formal requirements of political right act as constraints on the content of laws, that is those that cannot be accepted by individuals as their own laws are those which do not express the subject's own right to self-determination. Coercive political power is only legitimate if it appeals to reasons that any individual member of the state would freely endorse. Publicity, that is the requirement that laws be codified in such a way that all citizens, if inclined, will be able to comprehend and endorse them, is, here, the most significant: in order for a law to motivate me, I must be able to act upon its ground as though it were my own motivation. In that way, I remain free. Kant's avowal of rational autonomy sets the stage for the legitimation of political power in the liberal tradition, culminating in Rawls's own principle of legitimacy:
Our exercise of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the reasons we would offer for our political actions -were we to state them as government officials -are sufficient, and we also reasonably think that other citizens might also reasonably accept those reasons. 2 Publicity establishes, expresses and protects individual autonomy since a legitimate law is grounded in reasons that an individual would, if he or she were to deliberate impartially, acknowledge as his or her own. Put simply, I am not coerced by the state into wearing a seatbelt as, if I were to reflect, I would freely constrain myself given the rational ground of the dictate. A law is a rational shortcut, a reminder or a prompt, but (ideally) not an imposition.
The putative assumption of contemporary political thought is that the above liberal account of legitimacy entails a universal rights-based and state-to-state model of international relations. However, it may well be that this very presupposition is an orthodox dogma which obstructs a more appropriate and uncorrupted cosmopolitan approach to specific global issues. The reason why liberal rights-based approaches are prevalent would seem to be quite straightforward: publicity demands that one must evaluate the legitimacy of obligations and laws and the liberal position seems to be the only political theory that can offer a justification of these evaluations. Liberal accounts of rational legitimation of law are superior to embedded or contextual ones in that they allow a radical critique of existing laws and institutions from a universal point of view. Embedded or culturally sensitive accounts of rational legitimation are ill-placed to evaluate other cultures because of their affinity to relativism and political legitimacy seems to amount to positive law; one is obliged to obey in virtue of being a member of a certain community. At the international level this problem is compounded since only universal values will be effective to motivate the obedience of however, already been given before the act was carried out. In the reported words of Mullah Mohammad Omar we were told: "Because God is one God and these statues are there to be worshipped and that is wrong. They should be destroyed so that they are not worshipped now or in the future. will generally entail that all contingent factors -such as culture, identity and tradition -will have to be bracketed off; that is, pushed to one side. One looks at the question not from the point of me as personal identity, but from the view with which all rational beings can agree no matter what their origins. 4 Does the aspiration to universality resolve the problem? On the one hand, the reason is offered that the destruction of false idols is in accordance with God's will. 5 It would seem that Mullah Omar has already committed himself to a relative argument, in the sense that he expects his listener to embrace the fundamental presuppositions of his way of life, that is orthodox Islam. Surely, if one can find a universal, secular argument for the preservation of the statues, Omar's prescription will be trumped and negated. There was almost universal horror at the wanton destruction of these idols, so one would assume that there are universal principles available. One might claim "respect" or "tolerance", but Omar may well demand the same for Islam: respect for
Islam requires understanding of his actions and tolerance for Islam to carry out the dictates of its religion. Conversely one may claim that the statues are significant for "humanity's heritage" but such a vacuous appeal, even if a follower of Omar may agree to it, weighs ill against the requirements of divine law. It seems that universal principles do not help (or -worse -are just not available) for this particular problem.
Any appeal to the basic needs and rights required by liberty, equality or welfare is similarly unhelpful.
Liberalism's dogmatic assumption of universality relies on a coincidence between, firstly, the rights generated by universalism and the goods of the individual, an assumption which may be made at the national but not necessarily at the international level, and, secondly, that not only do all humans want liberty, security, welfare and equality but they also agree on the substantive content and hierarchy of these goods. and shared values, embodied in political structures and institutions; a shared moral homogeneity which is absent at the international level. The liberal sleight of hand is harder to conceal in the global arena and yet it still obstructs agreement and free thinking since it is assumed that if coincidence is absent, then other participants in the dialogue are irrational, unreasonable or, simply, in error.
Prior to Kant, both the agenda and the failure of any liberal cosmopolitics had been set by Rousseau: he desired to construct the conditions in which freedom and equality were maximised in spite of rather in accordance with the wishes of the citizens themselves. 6 Therein lay the origin of the greatest contradiction of modern liberalism and also the fulfilled Enlightenment dream of cosmopolitan moral and political standards: how does one ensure that a strong enough moral homogeneity exists in order to garner agreement on laws between peoples? The answer may well be a communitarian one: through a shared tradition and history of social meaning and values. Before Rawls's own discovery of the tension between free institutions and the burdens of reason and an optimistic hope in the formation of a "sense of justice", Rousseau sought to impose and support the liberal values of liberty and equality through draconian institutions such as a moral censor and a civil religion. 7 It is perhaps the case, contrary to liberalism's universalism, that secular, liberal principles adhere in our society because of the coincidence between these and our shared moral fabric, not vice versa. When raised to the international level, the moral fabric -that is those beliefs, concepts, values and norms which govern the subject's practical reasoning and derive from his or her membership of a particular culture, history or tradition -which supports the rights based approach to law is no longer ubiquitous and one is left with the choice: either to abandon cosmopolitan politics or to find an alternative approach. This chapter is a tentative attempt to offer an alternative approach.
2| The misrepresentation at the heart of liberalism
The criticism that liberalism is at heart disingenuous is now well-known and established, centring upon the conception of an abstract personality which engages in deliberation. 8 Liberalism itself is charged with being a conception of the good and not an impartial, universal point of view as it implicitly embodies certain social goods in its accounts of rationality and moral value which are unintelligible or undesirable outwith a specific culture. Social goods, critics of liberalism hold, are constitutive of the identity of the person and are dependent upon a tradition or community for their meaning. The abstraction from them in order to posit a universal account of personality is incoherent and leads to subjectivism: the idea that values are akin to mere preferences and tastes. This means that a dialogue, if one accepts the liberal worldview, is not between rational values and principles, but between tastes and preferences and the procedure of resolution will not be rational but due to the intensity (power) of one's preferences. At the local level, the problem goes unnoticed because there is a general ethical homogeneity between individuals and a minimal rationality is possible due to a shared moral fabric (we as a group share the meaning of "tolerance" or "respect" and can use it both formally and substantively in dialogue); 
3| Liberalism and the social contract
As Hobbes inaugurated the liberal project, he defined politics as the science of "men in multitudes" and political power was justified to minimise conflicting interests between individuals in a fixed territory. For Hobbes, the only motivation capable of securing political obligation was the universal, substantive desire for selfpreservation. 10 The problem for later liberals was that, in truth, Hobbes spoke of self- However, what was gained in stability, was lost in terms of motivation. The hypothetical nature of the contract was transposed from human nature to universal rationality; from "if you want x, then you ought to y (and all human beings want x)"
to "if you are rational, then you ought to y (and all human beings are rational)." Thus, the agenda of liberal politics was fulfilled: only those laws which would be acceptable to the free and rational individual were legitimate and could be sanctioned by the state. The meaning of "publicity" is that coercive political power is legitimate if it makes appeal to reasons that the individual would freely endorse in an ideal deliberating position: "All actions affecting the rights of other human beings are wrong if their maxim is not compatible with their being made public." 11 However, it is this very contractarian tradition which frustrates the political achievements of the cosmopolitan viewpoint. Kant's mistake -and consequentially that error which resides at the heart of most liberal transnational politics -was to raise the same demands of rationality into the international sphere. 12 The social contract model -the conjectural metaphor which Kant inherits from Rousseau -casts nations as persons and demands they act according to the rational will which represents the will of their citizens. 13 International agreements must meet the same demands as contracts reached at the national level: reciprocity, publicity and universality. The question becomes who the person of the nation actually represents.
Cosmopolitics will represent "community interests", but for any international law derived from these interests to be legitimate, it must be public and universal. Whereas 
4| The dialectic of rational legitimation
Cosmopolitics, in an attempt to respond to these anomalies, divides itself into two main strategies: the universalist and the particularist. 15 The first seeks universal consensus in desires or values that all human beings share. The advantages of such an approach are that it is inclusive as well as being non-perspectival. The disadvantages are, of course, the non-existence or formalism of universal values or desires and the denial of difference to the point of exclusion. The communitarian critiques of liberalism repeatedly assert that formal right is empty and unable to supply positive obligations unless accompanied by a substantive account of the good, or at least a guide to how to interpret the universal rights of liberty, equality, respect and dignity. 16 All agents may agree the world over that respecting one's dead is a social practice which ought to be tolerated and maintained, yet the obligations that such a practice involves may well be abhorrent to a specific culture:
Darius, after he had got the kingdom, called into his presence certain
Greeks who were at hand, and asked -'What he should pay them to eat the bodies of their fathers when they died?' To which they answered, that there was no sum that would tempt them to do such a thing. He then sent for certain Indians, of the race called Callatians, men who eat their fathers, and asked them, while the Greeks stood by, and knew by the help of an interpreter all that was said -'What he should given them to burn the bodies of their fathers at their decease?' The Indians exclaimed aloud, and bade him forbear such language. 17 If at the national level where a shared tradition exists or a dominant one defines the moral fabric which is to serve as a standard and a hierarchy of conceptions of the good, pluralism threatens the universal application of rights, then the problem at the international level can only be amplified, where there is no single, homogeneous or historically dominant conception of the good which determines values, positive obligations and substantive norms.
In contrast to this universalism, a second, particularist strategy identifies particular communities as persons with their own specific values, hence it proposes values which will motivate and be substantively efficacious in practical reasoning. But, this celebration of difference and openness to other ways of life is bought at the cost of comprehension and agreement:
According to all reports, it was Cortés himself, perhaps yielding to a subconscious impulse to justify his own deeds, who first attempted to convert Moctezuma. The emperor politely heard out the Spaniard's harangue. When the great conquistador invidiously compared the pure and simple rite of the Catholic Mass with the hideous Aztec practice of human sacrifice, however, Moctezuma put in a word. It was much less revolting to him, he explained, to sacrifice human beings than it was to eat the flesh and blood of God himself. We do not know whether Cortés was quite able to counter this dialectic.
Rational values dissolve into particular relative expressions of interests and worldviews incapable of convergence.
For a cosmopolitics to be adequate to its task, it must be articulated in terms of values which are intelligible and recognised by each community involved in the dialogue. In other words, these values must be universal without being empty, substantive without being local. One way values can meet this requirement is by respecting the difference between traditions and communities, but these values cannot be purely local or intelligible only to the specific few because reason cannot be a free and arbitrary play of concepts: one's values and political judgements must be structured and intelligible.
That is to say, those values and statements which are to play the role of legitimation must not just be intelligible to all, but must be possible motivations for all. Reason alone is stuck between the dialectical poles of the need to respect difference on the one hand and the need to make universal judgements on the other. In legitimating international law, a reliance on universal goods or rights leads to either empty agreement or simple non-agreement; whereas, a reliance on substantive conceptions of the good leads to relativism and non-agreement. Unless a universal account of human nature or interests can be found, then one either retreats back to formal right or abandons any hope of a cosmopolitan politics. 
5| The faculty of the imagination
If reason is the sole faculty which governs practical wisdom, then one finds oneself caught in a dialectic. On the one hand, if the prescriptions of reason are universal, then normative terms such as "respect" are formal and empty in that participants in a discourse can agree that respect is a good, but not what such a good should substantively entail, whether it be respecting one's dead or treating men as equal. On the other hand, if one starts from the particular prescription of reason, then agreement is at best improbable and, at worst, impossible. For me, homage to one's gods is paid by sacrificing willing victims, for you it is in metaphorically consuming His body, but one (or both) of us is just wrong. To say one ought to tolerate a repulsive practice because it can be understood in terms commensurable to both practices is to make the terms unintelligible to the participants in the discourse. One will be unable to use prescriptions -because they are to be generated bottom up -to criticise those practices in other communities that one feels, intuitively and reasonably, to be wrong:
the destruction of ancient statues, human sacrifice, cannibalism and also others not discussed here: female circumcision, slavery and child exploitation, for example.
Resolution may well be impossible since such an approach to the understanding of foreign cultures and cosmopolitan prescriptivism is dominated by the Kantian tradition and the faculty of reason. To put it more simply, it seems to ignore -and here it is in no way unique in philosophy -an alternative faculty or way of knowing, that is the imagination. One could invoke a separate, hermeneutical tradition which represents this way of knowing and its centrality to the human and social sciences which would contain names beginning from the Italian humanists, Vico, Herder, Dilthey, Heidegger, Gadamer, Berlin, Hampshire and Walzer which would represent this way of knowing and its centrality to the human and social sciences. Cosmopolitics understood in this way affirms itself as a fundamental commitment to the interests of humanity: each person is a citizen of the world and this affords him or her respect due to this status. The faculties of imagination and reason in tandem will allow agents to formulate prescriptions and laws which take account of this humanism and, therefore, meet the requirement of publicity. The imagination, though, faces the problem of normativity: can one say "you ought to imagine thus and so" in the same way that one can say "you ought to reason thus and so"? In order for an alternative cosmopolitanism which takes seriously the role of the imagination to be possible, one has to show that the imagination can impose normative constraints on its own production.
6| Vico and the new science
The nature of the constraints the imagination imposes on its own production should not be confused with universal ethical norms. If one were to do so, one would fall into the trap of rationalism and be guilty of imposing ethical norms on a discourse which is exempt from such considerations: a sane man can write American Psycho or film the Texas Chain Saw Massacre and we can imaginatively participate in reading or viewing such works. When one writes a horror, a science fiction or a detective novel, there are structural prescriptions dictated by the genre and these act as constraints on the possible production of imaginative objects. 20 Similarly, and more banally, when one imagines where one wants to go on holiday, there are constraints to the spontaneous formation of judgements concerning possible holidays. So, the object of our judgement is pivotal in the constraints that apply to our production. The mind can imagine any nature of cruelty or immorality and any number of oppressive, inhumane social structures, but the goal of the imagination in political cosmopolitanism is not to imagine a possible way of life, but more pertinently a way of life one would find intelligible and accept. In order to constrain the political imagination, one ought to firstly recognise that it is aimed at a specific production: the Prior to the word "science" being appropriated by the natural and empirical sciences, its meaning was broader, a breadth still implicitly in play in most Latin languages:
science was synonymous with the ways of knowing and these were plural, not merely the one sole method which we now nominate when we use the word. 23 For Vico, the knowledge applicable to historical understanding is that which is generated by the imagination. Perception is often erroneous, judgements are often immediate and unfounded and reasons offered to support these judgements are often defective. The only certain items of knowledge for Vico are those which the human mind produces. 24 The faculty which produces knowledge is ingenuity, the imagination, a faculty of the mind which invents in art, synthesises in geometry and perceives similarities between instances in arguments. Society is artificial, in the barest sense of being made by man, but its creation is not motivated by reason but emotion, first amongst all, fear. Any ahistorical account of natural law is in error because there is no one law accessible to all rational beings equally throughout history. Rather reason is dependent on contingent axioms derived form worldviews which are creatively born from the imagination and ingenuity of the first peoples and, most notably, their poets. It is a "conceit of scholars" to think that the laws of our day are adequate for earlier ages or that their own conceptions of law were either mistaken or inadequate approximations of our own.
Historical science has hitherto failed because it has sought to impose our own concepts and values on to minds which thought and lived differently from ourselves and also assumed that the way in which we understand the world is adequate to understand a former way of life. And, since history is necessary to sociology and political science, these two disciplines are also in error. The appeal to moral intuitions or common sense is valid only within a specific tradition:
Common sense is a judgement without reflection, shared by an entire class, an entire people, an entire nation, or the entire human race. This, and no other, is certainly the human nature which, at all times and in all places, has based its practices upon the following three common senses of mankind: first, that providence must exist;
second, that men should beget certain children by certain women, with whom they must share at least the rudiments of a civil religion, in order that children be bought up by their fathers and mothers in a spiritual unity in conformity with the laws and religions amongst which they were born; third, that the dead should be buried. 28 Myths, metaphysics and languages reflect the institutions which gave birth to them ("The order of ideas must follow the order of institutions.") and institutions reflect the "mental vocabulary" which is universal. 29 Vico calls this a common mental language:
human nature is a product of society, but for a group or tribe to be a society, it is necessary that they are bound by three necessary institutions: marriage, respect for the dead and religion.
Science must begin from "philology" or the laying bare (through hermeneutical analysis) of those assumptions implicit in the language, institutions, metaphysics and myths which ground and frame a way of life. Such a science must begin from the faculty of the imagination or ingenuity and not rational argument. So, if one is to imagine what life would be like for a human at a specific historical time, then one must firstly recognise that in order to be a human he or she must be moulded by those primitive institutions necessary for social living, that is marriage, death and religion which reflect the natural conditions of human existence. To imagine outside these is to imagine a being which is not human. And to comprehend the particular nature of a culture, one must look at the actual form of its myths, institutions and language in order to understand its view of the world and the agent's own understanding of his roles, duties and obligations. This ethics of interpretation is an alternative to the topdown approach of rationalism in that it appeals firstly to comprehension rather than substantive universal reasons.
When employed in history, sociology or political science, the imagination will be constrained by the dual axis of philology and philosophy. Philology is the hermeneutic interrogation of the myths, religion and self-understanding of a people.
Philosophy is the rational endeavour to divide what are merely contingent manifestations of desires, wants and preferences from the expressions of necessary natural and social needs. What counts as a possible reason for action depends upon the structural fabric of what is a possible human society and Vico's investigation reveals that in order for a human to be a human as opposed to an animal, his mind must be formed and informed by the social and moral fabric constituted by a theology, a metaphysics, the concept of responsibility and the motivation of self-love.
7| The philological-philosophical method as a way to formulate universal principles
The commonality of humanity is, then, represented by three universal institutions:
religion, marriage and respect for the dead. These in turn represent that the fact that humans qua humans will have a basic web of beliefs about creation, purpose and the intelligibility of the universe (religion, science, metaphysics), they will have basic divisions of roles and rights and a interlaced hierarchy of obligations and duties (family and class structures), and also they will see death as, in some sense, intrinsically significant in the life of the community as a whole and to the individuals who constitute that community (rites of death, sanctity of human life, the intrinsic worth of human life, a system of rights, et cetera).
Vico holds that the commonality of humanity is found in his social existence as constrained by a minimal naturalism and, so, he grounds his historical science in the faculty of imagination regulated by basic universal facts about human beings. It seems that, at base, the aspect of universality for political judgements is to be grounded in naturalism, but Hobbes's project, which sought to unite ethics with self-regarding reason to generate political norms, reduced human beings to asocial, atomistic bundles of desires that are too simple to explain the multifaceted variety of social behaviour. One may well object that it is folly to assume that participants in the international arena are committed to peaceful resolution rather than expressions of latent force.
Yet, such an objection misses a point central to cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism, following the picture outlined here, is a commitment to seek a resolution without recourse to violence and is an implicit avowal of the maturity of a tradition. The alternative is war. 31 Vico delineates three social paradigms, the ages of "gods", "heroes" and "men", and it is only in the latter of these that agents are committed to democracy and discursive reason. 32 Only those cultures which are examples of the "age of men" will be committed to cosmopolitanism since conflict resolution for the other ages would be violence and might (justified by divine right and natural power respectively) and there is no need to recognise others as humans with equal moral worth, but rather to consider them as barbarians, aliens, strangers and primitives.
By beginning from the faculty of the imagination, normative constraints on what is or
is not permissible in all cultures is possible. The imagination can ask the question whether this practice, institution or policy can be made intelligible or whether the agent ought to demand "bloody good reasons" for obeying it which do not seem to be available. In order to engage in reflection and conversation aimed towards peaceful resolution, one must belong to a mature, democratic tradition or, to use Vico's term, to the "age of men". And, in such a tradition, the commitment to equality and understanding (reciprocity) seems to put in question the sincerity and validity of reasons which would justify such practices as the destruction of ancient statues, ritual sacrifice, cannibalism, female infibulation, child exploitation and slavery.
8| The proper meaning of political liberalism
One need not endorse Vico's philosophy of history in its entirety, but it may well be an expression of something which has central importance for cosmopolitanism. In the previous section equality as a norm is one which is adopted by "mature" or This is once more an error highlighted by Vico. In order to make impartial practical judgements, Rorty assumes that obligations to others must be grounded in some sense of identification or a "one-of-us-ness". 33 On the national level, the state uses nationalism to foster such a sentiment. On the level of international relations, this requires a commitment to a common humanity which serves to constrain the play of the imagination. Imagination fosters fellow-feeling because it is a faculty which makes identification with others possible on the basis of what we have in common.
Vico's science posits as its ground a shared human nature which could form the basis of recognition on certain issues.
Rorty sees the formation of community through dialogue as a way to resolve conflict, as a form of justice. He again sees it as purely determined by reason, but already reason is broader and more in line with what has been described above:
In this account of rationality, being rational and acquiring a larger loyalty are two descriptions of the same activity. This is because any unforced agreement between individuals and groups about what to do creates a form of community, and will, with luck, be the initial stage in expanding the circles of those whom each party to the agreement had previously taken to be "people like ourselves". The opposition between rational argument and fellow feeling thus begins to dissolve, for fellow feeling may, and often does, arise from the realization that the people whom one thought might have to go to war with, use force on, are, in Rawls's sense "reasonable." They are, it turns out, enough like us to see the point of compromising differences in order to live in peace, and of abiding by the agreement that has been hammered out. They are, to some degree at least, trustworthy.
34
One could perhaps be more optimistic: we can come to comprehend the values of the other and imagination will constrain our interpretation from partiality through the historical-hermeneutic axes. Consensus requires both reason and imagination. It relies on, firstly, understanding but also on offering "reasons" acceptable to all.
Cosmopolitanism requires a sophisticated account not just of reason but also of the imagination, each constraining the other-not identification (we are the same) but recognition (I comprehend your difference and what we have in common). We share the same motivations even if expressed differently and our interests coincide more closely than those of national identity; we form a person of "common interest". And since we share an interest, if we form an agreement, I am sure you will abide by it and we can enter into the dialogue as a concrete person with an interest.
The maturity of a tradition and the subject who is at home in it commits the international sphere to a form of political liberalism, but one capable of avoiding the ambiguity of whether tolerance, respect and equality are substantive or formal values.
Hampshire has something similar in mind when he states that:
The opposite of monotheism and of this monomoralism is the recognition of polymorphous ideals and of diverse conceptions of the good, tempered by respect for the local conventions and rules of conflict resolution. It is reasonable to be a universalist in the cause of reasonableness in the regulations of conflicts ('hear the other side'), but not a universalist in the defence of particular outcomes of particular conflicts of moral opinion. 35 In the procedural sphere, one sees reason as dominate, in the sociological sphere one holds hermeneutics to be dominant. One must respect difference, but simultaneously strive for intelligibility, and also be sincerely committed to the aim of the dialogue, that is resolution or accommodation. Such an attitude characterises a mature tradition.
So, reason has two roles: one, the universalist demand for "respecting" difference and others (a necessary presupposition if one wants to overcome conflict rather than repress it); and two, the interrogation of a form of life and its motivations in accordance with basic human needs, wants and desires. Imagination augments this activity by revealing those standards of reasoning in play by both participants in the dialogue and reason formally demands that the dialogue be free and public and substantively demands that motivations be possible reasons for action for agents. The I stated earlier that for a cosmopolitics to be adequate to its task, it must be articulated in terms of values which are intelligible and recognised by each community whom the ruling affects. The hope is that the through the reciprocal regulation of reason by imagination and imagination by reason, values will neither be forced on nor unintelligible to individuals.
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